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Grid resilience | Case study

The Iberian Blackout of 28 April 2025: Cascading Failure in a DER Dominated Power System

A voltage-driven cascade, not a shortage of energy took mainland Spain and Portugal from a normal spring afternoon to total collapse in about five seconds. The failure propagated upward from a distribution layer saturated with inverter-based generation, past a defence plan built for a different kind of emergency.

Grounded in the ENTSO-E ICS Investigation Expert Panel Final Report (20 March 2026), building on the Factual Report of 3 October 2025. Economic figures from CaixaBank Research, Bloomberg Economics and CEOE.

12:33
CEST | total collapse
28 Apr 2025
~5 s
first trip to islanding
cascade speed
~59%
solar PV share
at the moment of collapse
>2.5 GW
generation lost
before separation
Scale 3
highest ICS severity
EU classification
12 / 16 h
restoration | PT / ES
fully restored 29 Apr

What happened

On 28 April 2025 the Iberian system was running with solar PV supplying close to 59% of Spanish generation and wind another ~12%. Synchronous machines, the rotating plant that anchors voltage and inertia had been pushed to the margins. The morning brought rising renewable output, 5 GW of exports, and increasing voltage variability. The system was N-1 secure on paper, yet structurally thin on the one resource that would matter: controllable reactive power.

Exhibit 1 | Generation mix at the moment of collapse
Inverter-based renewables (warm colours) dominate; conventional synchronous plant (slate) is marginal.
~59%~12%~29%Solar PV ~59%Wind ~12%Synchronous & other ~29%

In the half hour before the blackout, two distinct oscillation episodes swept the Continental Europe synchronous area. Operators damped them successfully, but the very measures that worked (cutting exports to France, re-coupling southern lines, changing the HVDC mode) had a side effect: they pushed Iberian voltage up.

First episode | 12:03-12:08
0.63 Hz | local, converter-driven forced oscillation
Concentrated between Carmona and Almaraz, next to an inverter-based plant. Not naturally present in the system, a forced mode injected by converter behaviour.
Second episode | 12:19-12:22
0.2 Hz | inter-area, East-Centre-West mode
A classic continental inter-area mode with strong Iberian participation, partly excited by the earlier 0.63 Hz oscillation. High transmission angle (~80°), missing power-system stabilisers, weak damping.

The five seconds of collapse

The incident began at 12:32:00. As voltage climbed, reactive-absorbing units began to disconnect and each disconnection removed absorption, driving voltage higher still. At 12:32:57 a 400/220 kV transformer near Granada tripped on over-voltage. Then, between 12:33:16 and 12:33:18, two waves of trips in Badajoz, Segovia, Huelva, Sevilla and Cáceres removed roughly 1.65 GW. In total more than 2.5 GW of generation and net-load rise accumulated before the system lost synchronism.

Exhibit 2 | Voltage and frequency during the incident
Voltage (slate) breaches the 435 kV limit and spikes toward 460 kV; frequency (red) holds near 50 Hz until the cascade, then collapses. After ES-FR separation at 12:33:21, all parameters fall away.
39040041042043044045046048.048.549.049.550.012:32:5012:32:5712:33:0712:33:1712:33:2412:33:35435 kV limittransformer tripovervoltageES-FR splitHVDC tripVoltage | Carmona (kV)Frequency (Hz)
Exhibit 3 | Accumulated generation loss versus voltage
Cumulative disconnection and net-load rise (amber) climb in steps as the 400 kV voltage (slate) is driven past the 435 kV limit | a self-reinforcing loop.
05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,000410420430440435 kV12:32:0012:32:2012:32:4012:32:5712:33:16Cumulative loss + net-load rise (MW)Voltage | Carmona (kV)
Exhibit 4 | The over-voltage disconnection cascade
Four disconnection waves, each removing reactive absorption and lifting voltage for the next, the “point of no return.”
05001,0001,5002,0002,500+52512:32:00-12:32:57PV, wind, net-load rise+35512:32:57Granada transformer+72712:33:16Badajoz | 2 substations+92812:33:17-18Segovia·Huelva·Badajoz·Sevilla·CáceresGeneration disconnected / net-load rise (MW) · cumulative > 2,535 MW

At 12:33:19 Spain and Portugal began losing synchronism with the rest of Europe. The interconnection to Morocco tripped on under-frequency (12:33:20.473), the France-Spain AC lines opened on loss of synchronism (12:33:21.535), and the HVDC link tripped last (12:33:23.960), completing the electrical separation. The Iberian Peninsula went dark. France lost only ~7 MW of load and one nuclear unit, the disturbance did not propagate into Continental Europe.

Why voltage control failed

The Final Report is emphatic that this was, above all, a voltage-control failure. Increased reactive-power margins, its simulations show, could have prevented the collapse. The reactive resources that could have helped were, in large part, present but not deployed.

Exhibit 5 | Reactive-power assets in South Spain at 12:33:00
Solid bars show reactive power actually in use; outlined bars show remaining, undeployed capacity. Note the large idle headroom in manually-switched shunt reactors.
01,0002,0003,0004,000185332PO 7.4 generatorsconventional, dynamic2,3151,002RES generatorsfixed power factor1,3002,700Shunt reactorsmanual, staticReactive-power capacity (MVAr) | solid: in use · outline: remaining, unused

Three structural gaps stand out. RES plants ran on a fixed power factor, so they absorbed reactive power in proportion to output and did nothing to oppose the voltage rise. Several conventional units sat below their reactive reference for more than a quarter of the hour, with no economic consequence for missing it. And shunt reactors were switched manually requiring operator decisions and processing time the cascade did not allow. Layered on top, many over-voltage protection settings diverged from the applicable requirements, and Spain’s wider 400 kV operating band left almost no margin between “allowed” and “disconnect.”

A counter-intuitive finding: the Panel showed that even significantly higher inertia would not have prevented the loss of synchronism, given the speed of the cascade. This was not primarily an inertia problem, it was a reactive-power and voltage-stability problem.

The distribution layer | where it started

Much of the early loss came from below the transmission grid. Between 12:32:00 and 12:32:57 net load in the distribution grids rose ~317 MW, part voltage-dependent load, part rooftop PV under 1 MW disconnecting as inverter over-voltage protection activated. The report correlates the proportion of small-inverter trips directly with rising transmission voltage and TSO-DSO flows.

Exhibit 6 | Low-voltage inverter trips track transmission voltage
As 400 kV voltage (slate) climbs through the late morning, the share of small (<1 MW) PV inverters tripping on over-voltage (violet) rises with it, the failure building from the distribution edge upward.
3904004104204304400%5%10%15%20%25%10:0011:0012:0012:3013:00Voltage | Carmona 400 kV (kV)Inverter over-voltage trips (%)

Root-cause chain

The blackout had no single cause. The Panel’s root-cause tree shows a set of concurrent contributing factors converging on one outcome, an uncontrollable voltage rise which then cascaded to collapse.

Contributing factors (concurrent)

Fixed-power-factor RES
Inverter-based plants absorbed reactive power in proportion to output | no response to rising voltage.
Reactive reserves off target
Several conventional units sat below their reactive reference for more than a quarter of the hour.
Shunt reactors manual & un-reconnected
Static reactive support needed operator decisions; some stayed disconnected from earlier oscillation episodes.
Protection set below limits
Many over-voltage trip settings diverged from the applicable requirements or system need.
Wider Spanish voltage band
A 400 kV range broader than the rest of Europe left almost no margin before disconnection.
Oscillation mitigation raised voltage
Damping the 12:03 and 12:19 swings meant cutting exports and re-coupling lines which pushed voltage up.

How it cascaded

Fast voltage increase
Cascade of over-voltage disconnections
Further loss of reactive absorption
Loss of synchronism | “point of no return”
ES-FR and ES-MA separation
Iberian blackout

Restoration

Restoration began immediately, combining bottom-up black-start islands with top-down re-energisation from France and Morocco. Portugal was back within 12 hours and Spain within 16, a credit to fallback strategies and operator commitment, though the Panel flagged black-start difficulties, voice-communication failures, and poor observability of distribution-level restoration.

Exhibit 7 | Restoration milestones
Selected milestones from the Final Report’s restoration mapping.
12:43
First re-energisation from France (Argia-Hernani 400 kV)
13:04
Spain-Morocco interconnection energised
13:06-14:48
Black-start units in Asturias, Cantabria, Duero
18:36
Portugal receives voltage via Aldeadavila-Pocinho
19:32
Southern (Morocco-fed) and northern (CE-fed) zones synchronised
00:22
Portuguese transmission grid fully restored | 12 h
04:00
Spanish transmission grid fully restored | 16 h

The economic impact

A ten-hour voltage event erased hundreds of millions of euros of output. The asymmetry is the point: a robustly growing economy absorbed the shock, but scaled across Europe’s decarbonising grids, the resilience premium is very real.

€0.0B€0.4B€0.8B€1.2B€1.6B€0.4BCaixaBankcard & ATM data€1.6BCEOEincl. industrialEstimated economic loss
~0.5%
Bloomberg Economics
of quarterly GDP (pre-rebound)
€175M + €130M
Single-site industrial
Repsol refineries · Iberdrola

Getting ahead of the next one

The very first factor in the Panel’s root-cause tree is not a device that failed, it is a blind spot: the absence of real-time monitoring of the gap between reactive-power output and its reference as voltage approaches critical levels. Closing that gap is the whole game. Preventing a repeat means continuous, wide-area observability of reactive-power margins and voltage-stability headroom across the TSO-DSO boundary tracking emerging oscillation modes and over-voltage build-up, and surfacing the “point of no return” minutes before it arrives, rather than in the post-event report. The data to do this already exists in PMU, SCADA and inverter telemetry; what has been missing is the layer that fuses it into an early warning an operator can act on.

Explore how this applies to your network

We work with system operators and asset owners on reactive-power observability, voltage-stability early warning, and cross-boundary TSO-DSO visibility. If the mechanisms in this case study map onto risks in your system, let’s talk.

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